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Abstract
Two fundamental differences exist between models of the organiza-
tional decision process based on participant recollection and those
based on archival data or field observation. These differences are
discussed and sources of bias in participant recollections are outlined.
Finally, suggestions for minimizing these biases in decision process
research are offered.

Introduction
It has been argued (Katz, 1953; Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Theoret,
1976, p. 248) that participant recollection provides the only satisfactory
data on the decision-making process. Examination of archival data and
field observation by researchers is sometimes seen as inappropriate because
the organizational decision process often leaves few traces in organizational
records and because outside observers who are not familiar with the details
of a decision cannot draw sufficient information from their observations
to generate accurate an model of the process. Mintzberg et al. (1976),
quoting Chester Barnard (1966, pp. 192-193) make the following point:
Not the least of the difficulties of appraising
executive functions or the relative merit of
executives lies in the fact that there is little
direct opportunity to observe the essential oper-
ations of decision. It is a preplexing fact that
most executive decisions produce no direct evi-
dence of themselves....
However, some researchers have developed models of the decision-
making process based on examination of organizational records and field
observation. These models are fundamentally different from those based
on participant recollection.
In this paper, the difference between the decision process models
developed through various research strategies will be outlined. Decision-
makers' and decision researchers' information processing limitations and
beliefs in rationality will then be discussed as possible sources of bias
in the recollection-based models. Finally, suggestions for minimizing
biases in future descriptive research in decision processes will be
offered.
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Models Based on Participant Recollection
Models of the decision-making process developed through participant
recollection are typically sequential and contain varying numbers of
stages or phases as well as feedback loops which allow decisional activity
to cycle between phases. Mintzberg et al. (1976) provide a well-known
example of this type of model. They developed a sequential and cyclical
model of the organizational decision-making process which involved heavy
emphasis on problem identification, diagnosis, and formulation. Their
model involves the following phases and routines:
A) The Identification Phase
1) The Decision Recognition Routine : Opportunities,
problems, and crises are recognized and evoke decisional
activity.
2) The Diagnosis Routine : Information relevant to oppor-
tunities, problems, and crises is collected and problems
are more clearly identified.
B) The Development Phase
3) The Search Routine : Organizational decision makers go
through a number of activities to generate alternative
solutions to problems.
4) The Design Routine : Ready-made solutions which have been
identified are modified to fit the particular problem or
new solutions are designed.
C) The Selection Phase
5) The Screen Routine : This routine is activated when the
search routine generates more alternatives than can be
intensively evaluated. Alternatives are quickly scanned
and the most obviously infeasible are eliminated.
6) The Evaluation-Choice Routine : An alternative is chosen
either through a process of analysis and judgment or a
process of bargaining among decision makers.
7) The Authorization Routine : when the individual making
the decision does not have the authority to commit the
organization to a course of action, the decision must
move up the organizational hierarchy until it reaches a
level at which the necessary authority resides.
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Further, the model describes cyclic processes by which decision-
makers may return to earlier phases as necessary. Dynamic factors in
the decision environment may delay or speed up the decision process or
may force decision-makers to repeat cycles (Mintzberg et al . 1976,
pp. 252-266).
Later research using similar methodology has confirmed and expanded
upon this sequential cyclical model. A study by Lyles (1981) involved
interviews of 33 business executives and yielded a sequential and cyclical
model focusing on the decision recognition and diagnosis routines of the
identification phase. Lyles 1 model includes the substages of awareness/
incubation, triggering, information gathering, and resolution, as well
as numerous feedback loops.
Clark and Shrode (1979) using data from interviews with 40 public
sector executives, developed a decision process model involving the
phases of perception of disequilibrium, problem definition, alternative
generation, and choice. In their model feedback loops are often the
result of external pressure on decision-makers. They also proposed a
model in which several decisions occur sequentially in dealing with
the -same particular problem.
Alternative Models
Witte (1972) and Cohen, March, and Olsen (1972) have developed
alternative models based on archival data and field observation respec-
tively. These bear little resemblance to the models previously discussed.
There are two major differences between decision process models based on
participant recollection and those based on archival records or field
observations.
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The first major difference between the two types of models has to
do with the nature or the "how" of the decision making process. Models
such as those of Mintzberg et al. (1976), Lyles (1981), and Clark and
Shrode (1979) describe the decision process as involving a number of
distinct phases. In Mintzberg et al.'s terms "we find logic in delineating
distinct phases of the decision process but not in postulating a simple
sequential relationship between them" (1976, p. 252). In place of a
simple sequential relationship, the authors describe a process involving
feedback cycles, interrupts, and numerous subroutines. However, this
model, as well as the other models cited, tends to imply that one type
of activity dominates others at a particular point; that decision makers'
attention is focused on one phase at a time.
These models are contradicted by the work of Witte (1972), which
was based on examination of records of company correspondence with re-
gard to the decision to purchase Electronic Data Processing systems. He
found no evidence for a focus of decisional activity at any particular
phase. Instead, four major types of decisional activities (information
gathering, alternatives development, alternative evaluation, and alter-
native selection) occurred simultaneously, with approximately equal fre-
quency, throughout in the decision process. The total level of activity
was high at the beginning of the process and at the end, just prior to
choice, with a relatively low level of activity between these points.
Witte summarized his findings in this passage:
Human being cannot gather information without in some
way simultaneously developing alternatives. They cannot
avoid evaluating these alternatives immediately, and in
doing this they are forced to a decision. This is a
package of operations and the succession of these pack-
ages over time constitutes the total decision-making
process (Witte, 1972, p. 180).
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The second major difference has to do with the purposefulness or the
"why" of the decision-making or choice process. Mintzberg and others,
through their flowchart models, imply that decisional activity occurs in
a stream and that the purpose of development activities like information
gathering and alternatives generation is to reach a decision.
However, as Mintzberg et al. point out, the data their research
assistants collected created an anamoly for their model. They report
in a footnote:
There is one consistent difference between the reports
(developed by their research assistants) and the model.
In some cases, development activity was reported without
selection activity following it. We assumed this to
be an omission in the reports, and in the examples be-
low, we always show development activity followed by
evaluation-choice activity, unless there was an inter-
rupt (Mintzberg et al. , 1976, p. 268).
Indeed, it is necessary for the integrity of their model to make
this assumption. However, alternative models of the organizational
choice process which do not assume that the process is purposeful, might
account for this apparent anomoly. Cohen, March and Olsen's (1972)
Garbage Can model of choice is perhaps the clearest statement of this
alternative type of model. This model represents one part of stream of
research including Cyert and March (1963) and March and Olsen (1979).
Though an attempt to fully explain the model here is inappropriate,
some of its basic features must be discussed in order to show how it
might explain Mintzberg et al.'s anomolous data. In describing the choice
process in an "organized anarchy," the authors construct a model which
involves independent steams of problems which persist through time,
potential solutions and solution technologies which evolve, and decision
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makers who are seeking a useful way to employ their time. Organizational
choice is seen as the almost random convergence of "several relatively
independent streams within an organization" (Cohen et al., 1972, p. 3),
of "choice looking for problems, issues and feelings looking for
decision situations in which they might be aired, solutions looking for
issues to which they might be an answer, and decision-makers looking
for work" (Cohen et al., 1972, p. 1).
It is possible for development activities like information gathering,
alternatives generation, and alternatives evaluation to continue for long
periods of time. However, solution of the problem only becomes possible
after a choice opportunity emerges through the almost random meeting of
these three streams. As Cohen et al. state:
A major feature of the garbage can process is the
partial uncoupling of problems and choices. Although
decision-making is thought of as a process for solving
problems, that is often not what happens. Problems
are worked upon in the context of some choice, but
choices are made only when the shifting combinations
of problems, solutions, and decision-makers happens
to make action possible. (1972, p. 16)
In such a process, it is possible for development activity to occur
without being followed by choice. Further, a number of problems may
become attached to a particular choice opportunity with the result that
the final choice may only parially resolve the problem which was the
subject of the development activity.
At least some studies, then, have suggested that the decision-
making or choice process is not a simple, sequential, or even purposeful
process. If Barnard and others are correct in stating that participant
recollection provides the only complete data on the decision-making
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process, then the models of Witte and Cohen et al. may be biased due to
incomplete information. However, another possibility is that the
organizational decision-making process is accurately described in these
models as non-sequential and quasi-random. If this is true, what would
explain the tendency of decision-makers to recall it as sequential and
purposeful?
Biases and Simplification Mechanisms
Research in the areas of cognitive psychology and behavioral decision
theory has documented a number of cognitive processes by which decision
makers impose order on their recollections ambiguous situations. March
and Olsen (1979) have suggested that past organizational activities
and choices are ambiguous and can be interpreted in a variety of ways.
This is true almost by definition for strategic decision situations of
the type studied by Mintzberg and others. Individuals involved in these
choices may construct rationales to explain the choices after the fact
in terms of their goals and perspectives on the process.
Ableson and Rosenberg (1958) and Steinbruner (1974) have discussed
perceptual distortions arising from the need for cognitive consistency
which could affect recollection of decision processes. These researchers
suggest that information will be interpreted (and perhaps selectively
ignored) so as to remove or reduce inconsistency between the information
and prior beliefs (Ableson and Rosenberg, 1958; Steinbruner, 1974, pp.
97-101)
.
Jervis (1976, pp. 217-282) discussed the tendency of foreign policy
decision-makers to adopt simplified cause and effect models to explain
past events involving the behavior of nations. It may be that such a
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need to simplify also effects decision-makers' recollection of their
own decision processes.
Cognitive psychologists have long recognized the tendency of indi-
viduals to reorder and reconstruct events in recollection. Bartlett (1932),
from his studies of the recall of unfamiliar narrative material, concluded
that human memory in addition to being reproductive, is also productive .
Individuals, in recalling this material, may omit parts, add others,
and rearrange the sequence of events. He stated that memory involves a
process of "imaginative reconstruction" (1932, p. 213). This reconstruction
is controlled by individuals' emotions, attitudes, interests, and
"efforts after meaning" (1932, p. 209).
Paul (1959) in extending Bartlett 1 s work, used a similar recall
task and found that distortions, omissions, and additions tended to
occur at those places in the text which contained gaps and ambiguities
and were lacking in sufficient redundancy to be adequately coherent. It
may be that such distortions also occur in the recall of decision processes
which are ambiguous, a feature of most strategic decisions.
Paul suggests that there are three points at which individuals'
predispositions and biases may distort recollections. First, these
predispositions may influence initial perceptions and interpretations
of stimuli. Second, they may influence the way these stimuli are
organized and stored in memory. Finally, they may influence the retrieval
of information and its reproduction. Tversky and Kahnemann (1974) touch
on this last point in their discussion of the availability bias in
which judgements are distorted by decision-makers' inability to recall
data bearing on the judgements.
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Other researchers have found that recollected material, compared
with the original material, showed evidence of such tendencies as
simplification, condensation, rationalization, and conventionalization
(Taft, 1954-; Tressalt and Spragg, 1941; Northway, 1940). If the same
types of distortions occur in decision-makers' recollections of decision
processes, it is likely that actual decision processes are more complex
and extended and less rational and conventional than decision-makers'
recollections of them.
Biases which effect the reporting of the decision process may also
introduce distortion in the recollection-based models of decision-making.
A number of researchers have dealt with social desirability biases and
demand characteristics as they effect subjects' behavior in experiments
(see for example Webb, Campbell, Schwartz, and Sechrest, 1966, p. 17).
If the decision-makers from whom the data is collected believe the choice
process should be sequential and purposeful, or if they perceive that
the researchers questioning them have this belief, they may distort their
reports of the process to conform to these expectations. James March (1979,
pp. 69-71) stated that the bias in favor of rationality is very pervasive
in our culture. By this he meant that people believe choices should be
made by relating projected consequences systematically to objectives.
If the sequential decision models are a part of this bias, managers
might "rationalize" their accounts of decisions due to a reluctance to
appear irrational. Further, Loftus (1975) has shown that "leading
questions" on the part of researchers can strongly influence individuals'
recollection of complex events. Leading questions by a researcher
committed to purposeful sequential models might lead decision-makers to
recall those aspects of a decision process which fit such models.
Conclusions and Implications for Future Research
It seems reasonable that decisions differ in terms of the extent
to which they can be described by purposeful, sequential models. For
those decisions which do fit these models, we would expect a high
degree of agreement among decision makers on the phases, cycles and
sequence describing the decision process. In those decisions better
described by more simultaneous or random models (such as those advanced
by Witte and Cohen, March and Olsen) we would expect decision-makers'
recollections to be dissimilar in these respects. They may each recall
the process as purposeful and report it as sequential. However, because
each has a unique perspective and unique needs and goals, each will
reconstruct and order the process differently.
It may be possible to combine the various data gathering techniques
to develop more objectively accurate or valid descriptions of decision
processes. Researchers' observations of the activities of decision-
makers and their examination of archival data could potentially serve to
confirm managers' statements about the process. Ideally, researchers
might construct models of decisions from observation and secondary
sources and then discuss these with the managers involved in the process.
However, time and resource constraints might make this sort of research
difficult.
Since the researchers' own biases and preferences for either sequential
purposive models or simultaneous quasi-random models may influence
their collection and interpretation or ordering of data relevant to a
decision process, it might be appropriate for two researchers, one de-
voted to each type of model, to simultaneously interview the same decision-
maker and participate in the "probing" questions which unavoidably
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structure the decision-maker's description of the process. Further,
these researchers should interview more than one decision-maker in order
to construct a description of the decision process which is less depen-
dent on a single perspective. Mintzberg et al.'s (1976) study apparently
did involve multiple interviewers and multiple decision-makers in many
cases. However, it is unlikely that the Interviewers had different
theoretical perspectives on the decision making process to guide their
questions. Further, the research assistants were specifically asked to
develop flow chart models of the process.
When decision-makers disagree in their descriptions of the process,
it may be possible, through simple discussions or a delphi-based interactive
process, to achieve concensus in the descriptions. If possible, the
decision process descriptions should be checked by the researchers against
archival data to assure that the descriptions are at least consistent
with the facts in these documents.
In any case, the considerations outlined in this paper suggest
caution in interpreting the models developed from information gener-
ated through managers' recollections. It seems likely that these models
involve clearer phases and are more purposeful and rational than the
actual decision processes they purport to describe.
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